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THE RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF SET-OFF (COMPENSATIO)
A journey through Roman Law to the New Dutch Civil Code
by
PASCAL PICHONNAZ (Fribourg/Lausanne)*
Introduction
Result of an extensive analysis of comparative Law, the new Dutch Civil
Code (NBW) has adopted the idea that the declaration of set-off (compensatio)
produces an effect from the moment when for the first time the two reciprocal
claims were capable of being set-off. Purpose of this paper is to present, in large
strokes 1, what historically led to this retroactive effect and why it is, in my view,
dogmatically inappropriate.
One understands usually by set-off of claims (compensatio) a mode of extin-
guishing obligations. Thus, according to set-off when two claims are recipro-
cally opposed, they can be extinguished up to the smaller amount if the require-
ments fixed by the applicable law are fulfilled. Despite its use in everyday life,
set-off has always been considered as a difficult subject-matter in its dogmatic
construction and its concrete application. The difficulty often begins already
with terminology. It is thus important to fix some points in this respect.
I will designate hereafter by main claim, the claim of the plaintiff in an ac-
tion, or the person against whom set-off is declared, and by counterclaim, the
claim of the defendant in an action, or the person who declares set-off. Thus, the
main claim generally is the most important one. If Albert has a claim of $100
against me and if he owes me $30, I will generally be the one who will declare
set-off, for instance when he claims payment, possibly in court. But one could
also imagine that the main claim is the lower one and that when I claim payment
of $30, Albert declares set-off using his claim of $100 and will have to claim the
payment of the remaining $70 afterwards. These distinctions are of course arbi-
trary, but they should help to clarify the concrete situations.
Whatever legal system is envisaged, set-off always implies at least two basic
requirements:
1. - Mutuality of claims (concursus debiti et crediti). In other words, in order
to envisage set-off, the claims must exist between the same parties and in the
* This is the text of a lecture given at the University of Amsterdam on 16 March
1999, at the University of Rotterdam on 18 March 1999 and in German at the University of
Salzburg on 15 April 1999. 1 have maintained the original presentation form, adapting it
very slightly. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank the participants to these
lectures for their interesting remarks. I thank B.LL. Martin Laing, Regensburg/Stellenbosch
(South Africa), who kindly helped to correct the English version.
1. For a more detailed analysis of this subject, see my forthcoming book, La compen-
sation lgale, Etude historique et comparative sur les modes de compenser.
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same rights. The situation was already envisaged by Roman law. Thus the em-
peror Gordian decided in a constitution of the year 238 AD that 'eius quod non
ei debetur qui convenitur, sed alii, compensatiofieri non potest' ('Set-off can
only be made with what is due to the defendant, but not to somebody else') 2 .
This principle is however not always strictly followed, in Roman as well as in
modem contract law, especially in the case of claim assignments, surety or rep-
resentation.
2. - Both claims must be of the same kind. By definition, it is not possible to
subtract one claim from another when the two claims are not identical in kind.
Normally, one sets off an amount of money with another amount of money, or
wheat with wheat or wine with wine, to cite the usual examples used since the
time of Gaius (Gai. 4,66) up to modem codification3 . As soon as a claim con-
cerns specific goods, set-off is no longer possible.
To these basic requirements, one has to add specific requirements related to
the particular mode of set-off. Thus, claims sometimes have to arise out of the
same contract or out of different contracts, they must be enforceable, they must
be due, and one or both claims must be liquid 4, i.e. their existence and extent
must be easily determined or both claims should even be certain.
In the same way, the mode whereby set-off is activated differs from one sys-
tem to the other. There are basically four different ways:
1. -Automatic set-off as in art. 1290 French Civil Code5 (CCfr) and codes
deriving from it such as the Spanish (art. 1.202), the Italian (art. 1242 seq.) Civil
Codes and the [Oud] Burgerlijk Wetboek (art. 1462); as well as in the Austrian
2. Gord. C. 4,31,9; see already in this sense Paul. D. 16,2,9 and Paul. D. 16,2,23 (Id
quad pupillorum nomine debetur si tutor petat, non posse compensationem obici eius
pecuniae, quam ipse tutor suo nomine adversario debet).
3. See for instance art. 1291 al. 2 CCfr. - On the requirement of claims of same kind,
see for instance art. 1291 al. I CCfr., for details, B. Starck / H. Roland / L. Boyer, Droit
civil, obligations, vol. 3, 5th ed., Paris 1997, no. 326 seq.; F. Terr& / Ph. Simler / Y. Lequette,
Droit civil, Les obligations, 6thed., Paris 1996, no. 1298; § 387 BGB, for details, J. Gem-
huber, Die Erfihllung und ihre Surrogate, 2nd ed., Tiibingen 1994, p. 236 seq.; art. 6:127
(N)BW, for details, see C. Asser / A.S. Hartkamp, Asser's Handleiding tot de Beoefening
van het Nederlands BurgerlijkRecht, Part 1, 4th ed., Zwolle 1996, no. 534; § 1440 ABGB,
for details, P. Rummel, in: Rummel, Kommentar zum ABGB, 2nd ed., 1992, § 1440, no. 1;
H. Honsell / P. Heidinger, Praxiskoninentar zum ABGB, 2nd ed., Wien 1997, § 1440
ABGB, no. 1; art. 120 al. 1 CO, for details, V. Aepli, Ziircher Kommentar zum Schweizeri-
schen Zivilgesetzbuch, Obligationenrecht, V th: Das Erl6schen der Obligationen (Art.
114-126 OR), 3rd ed., Zilrich 1991, art. 120 no. 49 seq.; and in a comparative perspective,
Ph. Wood, English and International Set-off, London 1989, no. 24-145C seq.; R.
Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung, Eine rechtsvergleichende Skizze zum Europdischen
Vertragsrecht, in: V. Beuthien et al., Festschrift fir Dieter Medicus, Miinchen 1999, p. 707
seq., esp. p. 731 seq.
4. See for instance art. 1291 al. 1 CCfr.; art. 1243 al. 1 CCit. - On the requirement of
liquidity, see among others, Starck / Roland / Boyer, Droit civil (n. 3), no. 329 seq.; Terre
/ Simler / Lequette, Droit civil (n. 3), no. 1299; on Italian law, recently M. Kannengiesser,
Die Aufrechnung im internationaten Privat- und Verfahrensrecht, Tiubingen 1998, p. 13
seq. and in a comparative perspective, Ph. Wood, English and International Set-off (n. 3),
no. 2-68, 24-24 seq.; Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung (n. 3), p. 707 seq., esp. p. 734 seq.
5. 'La compensation s'op~re de plein droit par la seule force de la loi, meme A l'insu
des d~biteurs; les deux dettes s'&teignent r~ciproquement, A l'instant o6 elles se trouvent
exister i )a fois, jusqu'A concurrence de leurs quotit~s respectives'.
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Allgemeines Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (§ 1438 ABGB6 ), at least in the way it
was understood initially and, of course, in the Prussian Code (Allgemeines
Landrecht fuir die preussischen Staaten, ALR 1, 16, § 3017);
2. - Set-off by declaration, as adopted by legislation inspired by the
Pandectists of the 19th century, such as in the Dresdener Draft (of a general
German statute on obligations) of 1866 (art. 3728), the German Civil Code of
1900 (§ 388 al. I BGB9 ), the Swiss Code of obligations of 1907 (art. 124 al. I
CO0 ), and recently the new Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (art. 6:127 al. 1 NBW" l);
3. -Judicial set-off, in which the judge is entitled to declare set-off, such as in
the Common law' 2 or in Roman law;
4. - Conventional set-off, which is known in every legal system 3; it is also
the most usual way for parties to set-off in practice; one may think, for instance,
of the interbancal clearing, netting-agreements, or general practice in interna-
tional trade contracts.
As I will indicate, an understanding of the various ways of activating set-off
is of particular importance with regard to the question of the retroactive effect
of set-off. I understand by that expression what art. 6:129 para. 1 NBW describes
as follows: 'De verrekening werkt terug tot het tijdstip, waarop de bevoegdheid
tot verrekening is ontstaan' ('Set-off is retroactive to the time that the right to
set-off has arisen" 4 ); or as stated by article 124 para. 2 CO: 'Les deux dettes
sont alors r~put~es 6teintes, jusqu'A concurrence du montant de la plus faible,
depuis le moment o6 elles pouvaient &tre compens~es' ('If this has occurred, it
is considered that the claim and counterclaim, insofar as they compensate each
other, have already been discharged at the earliest possible time they could have
been set-off"1)' 6 .
6. 'Wenn Forderungen gegenseitig zusammentreffen, die richtig, gleichartig, und so
beschaffen sind, dass eine Sache, die dem Einen als Gliubiger gebiihrt, von diesem auch
als Schuldner dem andern entrichtet werden kann; so entsteht, insoweit die Forderungen
sich gegeneinander ausgleichen, eine gegenseitige Aufhebung der Verbindlichkeiten
(Kompensation), welche schon ffir sich die gegenseitige Zahlung bewirkt'.
7. 'Sobatd die Forderung, durch welche die Compensation gesetzmassig begriindet
wird, entstanden ist, wird auch die Schuld, so weit die Compensation reicht, f'ir erloschen
erachtet'.
8. 'Die Forderungen und Gegenforderungen gelten mit dem Zeitpunkte, zu welchem
sie sich als zur Aufrechnung geeignet einander gegenuber stehen, soweit sie sich
ausgleichen, wie durch Zahlung getilgt. Diese Wirkung tritt jedoch nur unter der
Voraussetzung ein, dass der Schuldner dem G1aubiger erkliirt hat, von seinem Rechte zur
Aufrechnung Gebrauch machen zu wollen'.
9. 'Die Aufrechnung erfolgt durch Erklarung gegenilber dem anderen Teile'.
10. 'La compensation n'a lieu qu'autant que le d6biteur fait connaitre au cr6ancier son
intention de l'invoquer'.
11. 'Wanneer een schuldenaar die de bevoegdheid tot verrekening heeft, aan zijn
schuldeiser verklaart dat hij zijn schuld met een vordering verrekent, gaan beide
verbintenissen tot hun gemeenschappelijk beloop teniet'.
12. See for instance R. Derham, Set-off, 2nd ed., Oxford 1996, p. 20 seq. (Set-off by
Statute in England), p. 57 (Equitable set-off).
13. As it is almost self-evident, most codifications do not mention it; see however Art.
1252 CCit, for details Kannengiesser, Die Aufrechnung (n. 4), p. 4 4 seq. -On conventional
set-off, see among others K.-P. Berger, Der Aufrechnungsvertrag, Tubingen 1996; also
Ph. Wood (n. 3), no. 24-43 seq.
14. English translation by P.P.C. Haanappel / E. Mackaay, New Netherlands Civil Code
Patrimonial Law (Property, obligations and special contracts), Deventer-Boston 1990.
15. English translation by A. Reber, Swiss Code of obligations : English translation of
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Set-off has thus a retroactive effect in the sense that its discharging effect
goes back to a time prior to that of the declaration which activated it. In its
proper use, this retroactive effect fits only in a system where set-off is operated
by declaration. In a system of judicial set-off, the judge creates the requirements
of set-off. Set-off cannot thus take effect before the time of judgement or, if it
does, this is only because of procedural rules (e.g. the time of the opening of the
claim). This effect is then purely procedural and of no interest for us in relation
to the substantive problem we deal with here.
In its 1863 session, the authors of the Dresdener Draft (of 1866), which is in
a way the first draft of a German civil code, made the following statement in the
course of the discussion of today's § 389 BGB: '... wobei es sich, wie dies auch
aus Art. 356 erhelle, von selbst verstehe, dass die Wirkungen der Erklirung auf
den Moment zuriickzubeziehen seien, in welchem die Compensabilitdit beider
Forderungen eingetreten sei' ('it goes without saying, as it appears in art. 356,
that the effect of the declaration is to be reported at the time in which the two
claims could be for the first time set off')17 .
It is therefore legitimate to ask for what reason one would write on the retro-
active effect of set-off, when it seems to be so self-evident. I can give at least
two reasons:
1. - Some years ago, some authors in various European countries raised doubts
about the legitimacy of a retroactive effect of set-off'8 . And I am of the opinion
that their doubts are well-grounded.
2. - The Lando Commission for the unification of European Private Law,
which is commissioned by the European Parliament, is in the process of prepar-
ing a whole core of rules to unify European Contract Law'9 . In its third round of
discussions, the commission deals with among other legal questions the problem
of set-off. The project currently foresees a provision which denies any retroactive
the official text, vol. 1: Contract law (articles 1-551), ed. by Swiss-American Chamber of
Commerce, Zurich 1990.
16. See also § 389 BGB which states [Effect of set-off]: 'Die Aufrechnung bewirkt,
dass die Forderungen, soweit sie sich decken, als in dem Zeitpunkt erloschen gelten, in
welchem sie zur Aufrechnung geeignet einander gegenaiber getreten sind'.
17. Italic added; Protocolle der Commission zur Ausarbeitung eines allgemeinen
deutschen Obligationenrechtes, ed. by W. Schubert, Vol. 2, Frankfurt/Main 1984, p. 1261,
ad art. 349 (session of 13 November 1863).
18. Already P.F. von Wyss, Motive zu der auf Grund der Commissionsbeschliisse vom
September 1877 bearbeiteten neuen Redaktion des allgemeinen Theiles des Entwurfes zu
einem scheizerischen Obligationenrechte, Bern 1877, p. 39 ; P. Bidlinski, Die Aufrechnung:
Verjdhrung, Riickwirkung und § 414 al. 3 HGB, Das Recht der Wirtschaft .(RdW) 1993, p.
238 seq.; P. Bidlinski, Aufrechnung mit verjihrten Forderungen, Osterreichische
Richterzeitung (RZ) 1991, p. 2 seq.; P. Bidlinski, Die Aufrechnung mit verjdhrten
Forderungen: Wirklich kein Anderungsbedarf?, Archiv fir die Civilistische Praxis (AcP)
196 (1996), p. 276-304; S. Dullinger, Handbuch derAufrechnung, Vienna-New York 1995,
p. 172 seq.; Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung (n. 3), p. 707 seq., esp. p. 721 seq.
19. See Part 1, already published in 0. Lando / H. Beale, Principles of European Con-
tract Law, Part I: Performance, Non-performance and Remedies, Dordrecht-Boston-Lon-
don 1995; Part II (combined with the revised version of Part I) has been published in 2000,
and is available on Internet at: 'Principles European Contract Law 1998' (http://www.ufsia.
ac.be/-estorme/PECL2en.html) (5.1.2000); in the meantime, a third round of discussion
has begun working on assignment, assumption of debt, conditions, illegality, set-off, pre-
scription or limitation, and some other elements.
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effect to set-off; the effect of the declaration of set-off would be merely ex nunc.
It is therefore interesting to see whether this modem trend in favour of an ex
nunc effect is grounded on a correct dogmatic analysis of the problem.
The origin of the problem of retroactivity may be traced back to the under-
standing of automatic set-off and to the various interpretations given to it in the
Middle Ages (I.). This understanding evolved under the Pandectists' influence
during the 19th Century (II.). They admitted a fiction of a retroactive effect of
set-off grounded especially on two texts of the Digest which I will examine
briefly (III.). I will then mention some of the reasons which favour the renun-
ciation to any kind of retroactive effect attaching to set-off by declaration (IV.).
I. - Automatic set-off and its interpretation: the origin of the problem
To understand the problem of the retroactive effect of set-off, one has to
understand and follow, surprisingly, the evolution of the concept of automatic
set-off.
1. - The alleged Justinian origin of automatic set-off
The origin of automatic set-off ipso iure has long since been attributed to the
Emperor Justinian, who is alleged to have instituted it by way of a constitution
from the year 531 AD and confirmed in the Institutes of 533:
lust. C. 4,31,14, lohanni, a. 531:
pr. Compensationes ex omnibus actionibus ipso iure fieri sancimus nulla differentia
in rem vel personalibus actionibus inter se observanda. 1. Ita tamen compensationes
obici iubemus, si causa ex qua compensatur liquida sit et non multis ambagibus
innodata, sed possit iudici facilem exitum sui praestare...
pr. We decide that set-off operates ipso iure in all actions, without any distinction
between personal and real law suits (actiones). 1. However, we wish that set-off be
objected only if the matter out of which a counterclaim is used for set-off is clear
(liquidated) and not surrounded by many difficulties, but, on the contrary, the judge
must be able to solve it easily...
Inst. 4,6,30 if.:
... Sed nostra constitutio [C. 4,31,14, a. 531] eas compensationes, quae iure aperto
nituntur, latius introduxit, ut actiones ipso iure minuant sive in rem sive personales
sive alias quascumque ....
... But our constitution has introduced more widely set-off based on a right which
is evident, in order that law suits in rem, personal or of another kind are reduced ipso
iure ...
It is probably wrong to consider that Justinian's constitution introduced an
automatic set-off of claims20 . On the one hand, Justinian certainly innovated on
some points:
20. See however the majority of modern Romanists, who still consider that set-off was
automatic under Justinian, see for example Honsell / Mayer-Maly / Seib, Rimisches Recht,
Berlin et al. 1987, p. 276; Max Kaser, Das R6mische Privatrecht, II, Minchen 1975, p. 448
note 69.
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1. - He introduced the possibility of a set-off against the actiones in rem. He
stated this expressly: There is no difference to be noted between actiones in rem
or in personam ('... nulla differentia in rem velpersonalibus actionibus inter se
observanda')1 .
2. - Justinian introduced the requirement of liquidity of the counterclaim (C.
4,31,14,1 '... si causa ex qua compensatur liquida sit').
On the other hand, Justinian did not innovate by speaking of a compensatio
ipso iure2 2:
1. - The word itself was not new. It has been used by classical jurists such as
Paul (D. 16,2,21; D. 16,2,4) and Ulpian (D. 16,2,10)23. The words 'ipso iure'
have a good explanation in each of these texts, which makes a Justinian interpo-
lation doubtful24.
2. - Justinian only ratified a previous practice. From the time of Diocletian
(284 AD), procedural requirements became less and less formal in the post-
classical extraordinary proceedings. It was thus possible, under Justinian also,
to invoke set-off not only at the beginning of the proceedings (in limine), but
even later on, just before the judgment or even on appeal25 . It was then possible
for a defendant to delay a judgment by merely invoking set-off, the judge being
compelled to examine the exception and the validity of the counter-claim. It
was thus not necessary to invoke a special exceptio (which was no longer under-
stood in a technical sense) at the beginning of the proceedings. Thus, Justinian
was of the view that the possibility of set-off was included, immanent to any
action (or claim). The right to ask for set-off was already included in the claim
or the actio itself (ipso iure). That is the reason why he recognized that all the
actions could be reduced if one invoked the existence of a counterclaim. By
speaking of compensatio ipso iure, he thus merely stated what already existed
since Diocletian.
This is not the place to deal in full with the question of ipso iure compensatio
in Justinian times 26. The Justinian constitutio is merely the common text upon
which later jurists would build their theory of an automatic set-off.
21. In his Institutes, Justinian added that set-off can be invoked also in other claims
('alias quascumque'), but one does not see easily to which claims Justinian wanted to
refer, since at the begining of the title de actionibus (Inst. 4,6,1), the main subdivision is
made between claims in rem and inpersonam ('summa divisio in duo genera deducitur: aut
enim in rem sunt aut in personam'). Justinian might have referred to pretorian claims, also
mentioned by the Institutes (Inst. 4,6,3: 'Aliae autem sunt, quas praetor ex sua iurisdictione
comparatas habet').
22. For an opinion in the same direction R. Zimmermann, Law of obligations, Paper-
back, Oxford 1996, p. 766 seq.
23. See also Gai. 3,81.
24. The ambit of this paper does not allow to examine this question in particular; for a
detail presentation, see my forthcoming book on compensatio (n. 1).
25. M. Kaser/K. Hackl,Das Rdmische Zivilprozessrecht, 2nded., Miinchen 1996, p.
585 and authors cited.
26. Among others Biondo Biondi, La compensazione nel diritto romano, Cortona 1927,
p. 127 seq.; Siro Solazzi, La compensazione nel diritto romano, Napoli 1950, p. 147 seq.
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2. - The interpretation of set-off in the Middle Ages
Even if Justinian did not introduce a system of automatic set-off, one must be
aware that the first commentators of the Digest already understood the expres-
sion ipso iure in that sense.
Thus, Theophilus, a professor in Beyrut, co-author of the Justinian Institutes,
was of the view in his Greek paraphrase of the Institutes that the expression
'actiones ipso iure minuant' had no other significance than that set-off was au-
tomatic and did not need any particular act of one or the other party to be effec-
tive 27 . He wrote: 'If somebody has an action for 10 coins against me but owes
me 3, as soon as he begins to owe 3 to me, at the same time the action is reduced
by 3 golden coins against me, so that I appear to owe him not 10 but only 7'.
During the Middle Ages, it is possible to note two different understandings of
the words ipso iure:
1. - Some authors considered that set-off was automatic and 'sinefacto hominis',
as Theophilus did. The first which seems to do so was Martinus Gosia2 8. The
fact that he had a different opinion than the other doctores of Bologna is not
really surprising 29 .
2. - The Glossa30 , following Johannes Bassianus 3' or his pupil Azo among others,
recognized an automatic set-off, but required a declaration in court. A dis-
tinction was drawn, however, between two types of cases. In the ordinary case,
the defendant had to plead set-off in court32 , but set-off had nevertheless an
automatic effect, and in some specific cases (for interest and for claims which
had arisen out of delicts 33 ), set-off was automatic without any act of the defen-
dant 34 .
27. Theophilus Antecessor, Institutionum Graecaparaphrasis, ad Inst. 4,6,30, vol. 2,
Aalen 1967 (reprint ed. Berlin 1897), p. 4 3 2 seq.
28. Cf. GI. ipso jure ad C. 4,31,4; Hugolinus, Diversitates sive dissensiones dominorum
super toto corpore iuris civilis, in: G. Haenel, Dissensiones dominorum sive controversiae
veterum itris romani interpretum qui glossatores vocantur, Aalen 1964 (reprint of ed.
Leipzig 1834), p. 423.
29. The litterature on Dissensiones seems to find its grounding on the numerous dis-
senting opinions between Martinus and Bulgarus; see for such a position G. Dolezalek, Die
Casus Codicis des Wilhelmus de Cabriano, in: W. Wilhelm (edit.), Studien zur europdischen
Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt/Main 1972, p. 45; see also H. Lange, R6misches Recht im
Mittelalter, vol. 1: Die Glossatoren, Mainchen 1997, p. 218, who cites Azo, Summa Codicis,
ad C. 7,43,8.
30. GI. si constat ad C. 4,31,4.
31. See GI. si constat ad C. 4,31,4; on Johannes Bassianus, pupil of Bulgarus, see
Lange, Die Glossatoren (n. 29), p. 215 seq.
32. Azo, Summa Codicis, ad C. 4,3 1, no. 13, fol. 97 (ed. Lugduni 1557): 'Et dixerunt
quidam earn fieri ipso iure, ut etiam hominis facto non sit opus. Et dicunt, ius ipsum com-
pensat. Sed ego puto earn ipso iure tunc demum fieri cum a partibus est opposita: ut dixit
textus Institutionum de act. § Compensationes in fi. titu. [Inst. 4,6,39]'.
33. Eventually the authors recognized four cases, see for instance Jacobus de Ravanis,
Lectura super tit. de actionibus, in: L.J. van Soest-Zuurdeeg, La Lectura sur le titre de
actionibus (Inst. 4,6) de Jacques de Rvigny, 6dition du texte, pr~c~d~e de prol~gom~nes,
Leiden 1989, p. 293, Ii. 183 seq. ad Inst. 4,6,30: 'Et quod dictum est 'ipsum ius non
compensat sine obiectu hominis', verum est nisi in quatuor casibus, in quibus ipso iure fit
compensatio. Hic fuit in debitum ex maleficio [...]. Item in alio casu: ut evitetur pena,
ipsum ius compensat absque hoc quod obiciatur compensatio ab homine. Item ut evitetur
cursus usurarum [...]. Vel ut pignus liberetur [...]'.
34. GI. si constat ad C. 4,31,4; Azo, Summa Codicis, ad C. 4,3 1, no. 13, fol. 97: 'Secus
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It is important to understand that for Azo the declaration had no substantive
effect; set-off was automatic, but the judge could only take it into account if it
had been pleaded in court35.
This latter conception of an automatic set-off made subject to a declaration in
court was the view of the majority of the authors3 6. Cynus37 and Bartolus 38,
among others, followed such an approach. Apart from doctrinal justifications,
practical considerations motivated also the authors to follow this theory. For
instance, loachim Mynsinger von Frundeck (1514-1588), cameralist (i.e. an au-
thor who first edited decisions or summaries of decisions taken by Law Courts)
was also of the view that a party has to invoke set-off in court to make it pos-
sible for the judge to consider set-off 9 , since otherwise he could not be ex-
pected to guess the application of the latter ('qui iudex utique divinare nequit').
Martinus' position was, however, followed by the French historical school,
especially by Cuiacius (1520/1522-1590) 4° . Tyndarus, who wrote a treaty on
set-off in the 16th century, tried again to explain Martinus' opinion and adopted
his conception of an automatic set-off without any declaration41 . He had a direct
influence on Domat4 2 and on Pothier and his treaty on obligations43 . As one
dico in delictis, in quibus etiam sine facto hominis fit compensatio ipso iure: ut supra
diximus'.
35. See for such an explanation Cynus Pistoriensis, In Codicem et aliquot titulosprimi
pandectorum ... Commentaria, ad C. 4,31,4 (ed. Francoforti ad Moenium 1577, reprint
Torino 1964, fol. 244A).
36. See for a detailed presentation Sebastianus Medices (1543-1598), De compensa-
tionibus, pars I, Qu. 21 (ed. in: Tractatus universi iuris, Vol. 6, Pars 2, Venetiis 1584).
37. Cynus, In Codicem, ad C. 4,31,4, fol. 244A.
38. Bartolus a Saxoferrato, ad C. 4,31,4, si constat, no. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1602, vol. 7,
fol. 147).
39. loachim Mynsinger von Frundeck, Apotelesma, ad Inst. 4,6,30, no. 9 (ed. Coloniae
1659): 'Generalis regula, sive thesis, ex hoc tex. colligenda est: videlicet, quod omnis actio
idem habet ... Cuiuscumque generis et qualitatis hodie ipso iure per compensationem
tollatur, in tantum, quantum compensari debet. Excepta sola depositi actio'.
40. Jacobus Cuiacius, In lib. III. Quaest. Papin., ad D. 16,2,7 (ed. Opera omnia, vol.
4, col. 668): 'Moribus Galliae non fit ipso iure, ac ne remedio quidem exceptionis, sed ex
rescripto principis nominatim, par lettres de chancellerie, non potest uti compensatione is
unde petitur, nisi id princ[eps] nominatim concedat. Jure nostro, id est Romanorum, com-
pensatio in omnibus iudiciis fit ipso iure ... hoc est, compensationem fieri ipso iure mero
ure. Et ideo, si ego ate acceperim 100 ex aliqua causa, et tu mihi debeas 30, ipso iure non
debeo 100 sed 70 tantum, quia aes tuum minuit aes meum ipso iure, et ex 70 tantum usurae
debebuntur ex mora in bonae fidei iudiciis'.
41. Alphanus Tyndarus, De compensationibus, art. 6 and his conclusions (ed. in:
Tractatus universi iuris, Vol. 6, Pars 2, Venetiis 1584, f, 253r, 255r): 'Prima est, quod com-
pensatio omni casu fit ipso iure ab ipso initio tempore contractorum debitorum, etiam sine
hominis ministerio in rebus et iuribus compensabilibus, quam tamen conclusionem sub
nube enuntiat solus Mar[tinus] glo[sator] antiquus'.
42. Jean Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, le droit public et legum de-
lectus, 2nd ed., Paris 1756, t. 1, liv. IV, tit. 1I, sec. 1, no. 4, p. 288: 'La compensation 6tant
naturelle, elle a d'elle-meme son effet et de plein droit, quoique ceux qui peuvent compenser
ne s'en avisent pas et quand meme l'un et l'autre ignoreraient les dettes qu'ils ont A
compenser, car 1'6quit6 et la v~rit6 font que chacun d'eux 6tant en mrnme temps et crdancier
et d~biteur de l'autre, ces qualitds se confondent et s'an~antissent'.
43. Robert Joseph Pothier, Trait6 des obligations, in: (Euvres completes, tome II, Paris
1821, no. 635: 'Lorsqu'on dit que la compensation se fait de plein droit, ipso iure, cela
signifie qu'elle se fait par la seule vertu de la loi, sans qu'elle ait W prononc~e par le juge,
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knows, Domat and Pothier would be the main source of inspiration for the draft-
ers of the French Civil Code. This probably explains the solution of an auto-
matic set-off of article 1290 CCfr.
In this brief overview of the interpretation of set-off by lawyers from the
Middle Ages", it is interesting to set out the original opinion of Hugo Grotius.
His view with regard to the mode of set-off was not a new one, since he was of
the opinion that set-off was automatic, but had to be pleaded in court 5 . How-
ever, he sought to free this institution from the Justinian constitution and
grounded it on natural reason. In his work De iure belli acpacis (published for
the first time in 1625), Grotius recognized set-off as one kind of alienatio based
on leges naturae. He wrote the following (11,7,2)46:
Expletione iuris fit alienatio, quoties id quod meum nondum est, sed mihi dari debet,
aut loco rei meae, aut mihi debitae, cum earn ipsam consequi non possum aliud
tantundem valens accipio ab eo qui rem meam detinet, vel mihi debet. Nam iustitia
expletrix quoties ad idem non potest pertingere, fertur ad tantundem, quod est morali
aestimatione idem.
Alienation by legal compensation4 7 takes place when, from one who retains my prop-
erty or is in debt to me, I receive, as of equal value, something which is not yet mine
but which ought to be given to me in the place of a thing belonging to me or due to
me, and I am unable to obtain the thing itself. For whenever expletive justice cannot
acquire the same thing it tries to obtain something of equal value which, morally, is
considered the same.
In this passage, Grotius spoke clearly about a kind of datio in solutum imposed
by natural law. It is interesting to note that Grotius put on the same level the fact
that one party retains property of the other party and the fact that it is indebted to
it.
After underlining that it was forbidden by civil statutes to enforce one's right
by use of one's own force, he nevertheless recognized this right - a kind of
retentio in solutum - when courts ceased to act for a continuous period ('Locum
ergo habebit quod diximus ubi iudicia continue cessant'). A kind of set-off can
be recognized in this process4 8 and would also mean that set-off was possible
ni m~me opposbe par aucune des parties ... Je ne suis oblig6 d'opposer la compensation
que pour instruire le juge que la compensation s'est faite; de mdme que lorsque quelqu'un
me demande une dette que j'ai pay6e, je suis oblige, pour instruire le juge, d'opposer et de
rapporter les quittances'.
44. For more details, see my forthcoming book on this subject (n. 1).
45. See Hugo Grotius, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid III, 40,7; for
the critical edition in Dutch, see F. Dovring / H.F.W.D. Fischer/ E.M. Meijers, Leiden
1952 (reprint 1965), it includes Grotius' handwritten marginal notes written in 1639 in his
own copy of the 1636 edition and discovered in Lund in 1948; for the English translation,
I quote from R.W. Lee, The jurisprudence of Holland by Hugo Grotius, vol. 1, 2nd ed.,
Oxford 1953, p. 490 (reprint Aalen 1977).
46. English translation by F.W. Kelsey in the Classics of international Law (edited by
J.B. Scott), Oxford 1925, p. 268; Hugo Grotius, De iure belli acpacis..., ed. 1939 B.J.A.
de Kanter-van Hettinga Tromp, with annotationes novae by R. Feenstra et C.E. Persenaire,
Aalen 1993, lib. II, cap. 7, par. 2.
47. I would rather say 'by legal satisfaction'.
48. Speaking about set-off (De iure belli acpacis, 111, 19,15), Grotius referred expressly
to this passage.
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without referal to ajudge. If courts ceased to act only for a short duration, Grotius
allowed to take someone's thing, but was of the opinion that property over it
was only acquired when the judge made a ruling about it ('ubi vero momentanea
est cessatio, licita quidem erit acceptio rei [.. . Sed dominium a iudicis addictione
erit exspectandum'). Thus, this kind of retentio in solutum, or set-off, was mainly
justified by the fact that courts did no more act, otherwise a ruling by a judge
was required 49 .
Grotius then implemented these observations on the level of international
law, where no courts were available. He stated the following (De iure belli ac
pacis, 111,19,15):
The origin of set-off5° I indicated elsewhere (De iure belli ac pacis, 11,7,2) when I
said that if anything is ours or is due to us, and we cannot otherwise obtain it from
who has it or owes it to us, we can accept an equivalent amount in something else.
From this it follows the more clearly that we may keep what is in our possession,
whether it be corporeal or incorporeal. Therefore what we have promised will not
have to be fulfilled if the value involved is no greater than that of our property which
is wrongfully in the possession of the other (Seneca, De ben. 6,4,4)" 1.
He thus conceived set-off as a compensation for a duty which was not ful-
filled and could not be implemented by courts. He seemed to deal in particular
with the question of property wrongfully kept by the enemy52 . In this first step,
set-off was not understood as a way of extinguishing reciprocal contractual ob-
ligations. Grotius, however, reflected on this further by stating:
The same principle will hold if the party with whom I have dealings owes as much
or more under another agreement, and I am not able otherwise to secure what is due
to me. In the law courts, as the same Senecas says (De ben. 6,6/7), different actions
are separated, and the [formulae] are not mixed. But, as noted in the same passage,
those cases are guarded by definite statutes which it is necessary to observe: a law
must not be mixed with a law; we must go whether we are led. The law of nations
does not recognise those distinctions; in the cases which fall within its scope there is
no other hope of acquiring one's right53.
49. Grotius gave one further exception: 'Quod si ius quidem certum sit, sed simul
moraliter certum per iudicem iuris explementum obtineri non posse, puta quia deficiat
probatio; in hac etiam circumstantia, cessare legem de iudiciis, et ad ius rediri pristinum
verior sententia est'; 'if the right is certain, but at the same time it is morally certain that
enforcement of the right cannot be obtained from a judge, for the reason, for instance, that
proof is lacking, the truer opinion is that in these circumstances the law of the courts ceases
to apply and one has recourse to primitive right' (transl. by Kelsey, op. cit., p. 268).
50. Kelsey writes 'compensation' to translate 'compensationis'; it seems better to use
the technical word of 'set-off.
51. English translation (n. 46), p. 800; Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, lib. Ill,
19,15: 'Compensationis originem alibi indicavimus [lib. 11, cap. VII, § 2], cum diximus
nos, si quod nostrum est aut quod nobis debetur consequi aliter non possumus, ab eo qui
nostrum habet aut nobis debet tantundem in re quavis accipere posse: unde sequitur ut
multo magis possimus id quod penes nos est sive corporale est sive incorporale retinere.
Ergo quod promisimus poterit non praestari si non amplius valet quam res nostra, quae sine
iure est penes alterum. Seneca libro de beneficiis sexto [cap. 4]
52. Chapter 19 deals indeed with this question: 'Defide inter hostes'.
53. English translation (n. 46), p. 801; Grotius, De iure belli acpacis, 111, 19,16: 'Idem
erit si ex alio contractu is qui cum negotium est, plus aut tantundem debet, idque ego aliter
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He applied thus the same principle to the situation in which a party owes me
as much or more money than I owe him. And this is the typical situation of
someone who has a counterclaim. If I could not secure my counterclaim, what I
promised had not to be performed. From this principle, one could admit that set-
off must necessarily be automatic in international law. In absence of courts, it
was imposed by natural law to ensure that the creditor got what he was entitled
to.
Although Grotius did not deal specifically with contracts under national Law,
these statements gave a new justification for set-off, independant from the Jus-
tinian constitution. They showed how set-off could be conceived as an auto-
matic mechanism. Of course, for Grotius, set-off had to be pleaded in court
under national law, since there was a judge available in the national system, and
since otherwise the fact could not be known ('om datmen anders daer van niet
en kan weten'), as said Grotius in his Inleidinge54 . This last point is essential to
understand that, even under national law, set-off was conceived by Grotius as
having an automatic effect55 , but subject to be pleaded in court.
Automatic set-off when subjected to a requirement that it be pleaded in court
creates a situation which can be compared with a retroactive effect. In proper
theory however, pleading has only a declarative effect and not a constitutive
one. The judge has only to state the existence of a reduced claim; there is there-
fore no proper retroactive effect. In absence of a declaration, the judge has to
condemn the defendant for the whole amount of the main claim, but the latter
will be able to sue the claimant for unjust enrichment (condictio indebiti)!
Hugo Donellus had already noticed the difficulty of admitting, on the one
hand, that set-off was equivalent to a payment and of giving, on the other
hand, a kind of retroactive effect to its allegation. He felt then compelled to state
that
... tertium illud ad vim compensationis pertinens, ut compensatio pro solutione
habeatur ex eo tempore, quo pecunia utrinque deberi coepit, dubitari potuit, an ideo
esset admittendum, quia compensatio numerationem quamdam in se haberet. Dici
enim potuit ex eo tempore eam habere, quo primum obiicitur: quasi debitore tunc
primum pecuniam numerante, cum vult pecuniam sibi debitam pro soluto esse.
Dignum est igitur notatu, quod placet non exinde primum compensationem pro soluto
haberi ipso iure, cum obiecta est; sed ex quo primum obiici potuit, id est, ex quo
consequi non valeo. In foro quidem, ut idem Seneca (de Ben. 6,6/7) ait, actiones quaedam
separantur, nec confunditur formula: sed illa exempla, ut ibidem dicitur, certis legibus
continentur, quas necesse est sequi: lex legi non miscetur: eundum est qua ducimur. lus
gentium ista discrimina non agnoscit, ubi scilicet alia iuris sui obtinendi spes non est'.
54. Grotius, Inleidinge, Chap. 40 no. 7, p. 490 - For a similar idea, see also Iohannes
Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, ad D. 16,2 no. 2 (ed. Halae 1775/1778, vol. III, p.
280): 'Quamvis ergo verum sit, opponendas seu allegandas esse in iudicio compensationes,
ut iudex earum possit rationem habere, et catenus dici possint facti esse [Inst. 4,6,39],
effectus tamen earum totus iuris est, et existit ante allegationem; quippe quae non ad
inducendam compensationem pertinet, sed magis ad manifestandum, eam retro ab eo tem-
pore, quo coepit utrimque deberi, iam a iure factam esse; nec extinguit obligationem, sed
iam ante extinctam fuisse monet'.
55. See Grotius, Inleiding, Chap. 40 no. 7, p. 490 (translation by Lee): '... but [set-off]
takes effect by virtue of the fact, so that, if a person was to incur a penalty or other damage
in the event of failure to perform, [set-off] sets him free'.
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primum coepit pecunia utrinque deberi d. 1. 4 C. de comp. [C. 4,31,4]. Quod est
aequissimum ... 56.
With Donellus' statement the difficult question of the retroactivity of set-off
and its compatibility with the analogy made with regard to payment appears in
full light!
II. - The Pandectists' conception of set-off
Savigny's Historical School, which grounded its theory directly on classical
sources, gave a new orientation to the question of the effect of set-off.
Despite what one may think, it was not Savigny himself who gave a new
shape to set-off. He merely restated the Roman law, indicating that set-off was
first reached by means of an exception in the period before Justinian (ope
exceptionis) and ipso iure (i.e. automatically) thereafter. He did not give a gen-
eral answer for his period of time. I could only find one sentence dealing with
the question of time-barred claims, which may well indicate that Savigny was
still considering an automatic effect of set-off5 7 . He wrote: 'Wenn ich etwas
schuldig werde demjenigen, gegen welchen ich eine noch unverjdihrte Klage auf
dieselbe Summe habe und dann die Verjihrung ablduft, so werden jetzt alle
annehmen, dass sich die beiden Forderungen sogleich ipso iure zerst6rt haben,
so dass von einer Verjiihrung nicht weiter die Rede sein kann. (...)'. He was of
the view, moreover, that the position was similar when the counterclaim was
already time-barred when the main claim came into existence. It is therefore
apparent that this conception is only possible if one considers that set-off is
automatic.
One might be surprised that Savigny did not give more weight to the declara-
tion by the debtor, since one of the characteristics of the conceptions of the 19th
century Pandectists was to give a greater significance to the declaration of will58 .
Thibaut, the usual opponent of Savigny, followed Azo and Grotius by recog-
nizing an ipso iure set-off, subjected to a requirement that it be alleged in court"9 .
Puchta seems to have been the first to declare that the mere fact of having two
co-existent claims does not discharge them ipso iure. For him6", the creditor had
56. Hugo Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili, lib. 16, chap. 5 no. 34 (ed. Lucae 1764,
T. IV, col. 866).
57. F.C. von Savigny, System des heutigen r6mischen Rechts, 2nd ed., Berlin 1841
(reprint Aalen 198 1), vol. 5, p. 403.
58. See on this question, recently B. Schmidlin, Die beiden Vertragsmodelle des
europdischen Vertragsrechts: das naturrechtliche Modell der Versprechensibertragung
und das pandektistische Modell der vereinigten Willenserklirungen, in: Knutel / Meincke
/ Zimmermann, Rechtsgeschichte und Rechtsdogmatik, Miinchen 2000, p. 187-206.
59. Anton F.J. Thibaut, System des Pandekten-Rechts, vol. 2, 7th ed., Jena 1828, §
997: '...so erlbschen ihre gegenseitigen Forderungen, mit allen Wirkungen der Zahlung in
dem Augenblick, da sie gleich sind, bis auf die concurrente Summe. Dieses Erl6schen,
welches man compensatio (oder auch pensatio) nennt, kann in Ansehung seiner
Erfordemisse natiirlich durch willktihrliche Geschdifte bestimmt werden; es tritt aber auch
ohne dies nach den Gesetzen ein (compensatio necessaria s. iuris), und zwar ipso iure,
sobald gleiche Forderungen einander gegenfiber stehen, jedoch nur insofern, als sich ein
Theil darauf berufen will und kann'.
60. Georg Puchta, Pandekten, 9th ed., Leipzig 1863: 'Allerdings ist der Gliubiger, der
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to invoke set-off unilaterally (ope exceptionis), but the claim appeared to be
discharged by itself ('von selbst'), as if the declaration would have taken place
at the moment of the co-existence of both claims. Thus there is, in a sense, a
retroaction of the declaration itself But then awkwardly, however, Puchta added
that the claims had to be considered as if they were discharged ipso iure and if
someone has omitted to declare set-off, he must be able to use a condictio indebiti
to get back the amount paid which he could have set-off6 . This is typical of a
remark one would make in a system based on automatic set-off. We can see how
difficult it was to free oneself from the doctrine developed during the Middle
Ages. Has the declaration by Puchta a declarative or constitutive effect? It is
difficult to answer this question, as already noted by Eisele6 2 .
It is probably the works of Dernburg in his Geschichte und Theorie der
Kompensation (1 st ed., 1854) and of Windscheid (Die Pandekten, I st ed., 1862)
which give the dogmatic foundation to a system of set-off based on a constitu-
tive declaration and, at the same time, a genuine retroactive effect to set-off. It
is probably because of these works that the authors of the Dresdener Draft felt
entitled to hold that the retroactive effect went without saying. However, the
question was still controversial as one can see by the works of authors such as
Eisele6 3 , Schwanert 64 , Brinz6 5 or Ubbelohde6 6 (all writing on set-off in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century) 6 .
For Dernburg68 , the existence of an automatic set-off in Justinian's time was
historically not credible. He thought that ipso iure meant only that set-off oc-
curred without an exception (ope exceptionis)69 . He was of the opinion that the
claims are not specifically affected from the beginning, but that their extinction
is the result of a specific declaration by the debtor. But then, once the declara-
dasselbe schuldet, als befriedigt anzusehen, aber dieses muss, aus jenem Grund, durch
einen besonderen Act in Wirksamkeit gesetzt werden, durch Uebereinkunft bei der frei-
willigen Compensation oder durch einseitige Geltendmachung gegen die Klage des Gldubi-
gers durch den Schuldner, ope exceptionis. Es soil aber die Forderung, die Geltendmachung
und Zuliissigkeit der Compensation vorausgesetzt, als von selbst um den Betrag der
Gegenforderung von der Entstehung dieser an gemindert, gleich als wenn jener Act schon
damals eingetreten ware, und uberhaupt so betrachtet werden, als sei sie ipso iure (ganz
oder teilweise) getilgt'.
61. Puchta, Pandekten, p. 447: 'Ist die Compensation versiumt worden, so kann dies
dem Berechtigten die condictio indebiti geben'.
62. F. Eisele, Die Compensation nach r6mischem und gemeinem Recht, Berlin 1876,
p. 217.
63. Eisele, Die Compensation nach rdmischem undgemeinem Recht, Berlin 1876.
64. H. Schwanert, Die Compensation nach rdmischem Recht, Rostock 1870.
65. A. von Brinz, Die Lehre von der Compensation, Leipzig 1849.
66. A. Ubbelohde, Uber den Satz: ipso iure compensatur, G6ttingen 1858.
67. See also for a description of the discussion, Heinrich Dernburg, Geschichte und
Theorie der Kompensation, 2nd ed., Heidelberg 1868 (reprint Aalen 1965), p. 4-8.
68. Dernburg, Kompensation, 2nd ed., p. 293 seq.: 'Es ist allerdings kein Grund er-
sichtlich, warum man die Uiberkommene Auffassung [...] aufgegeben haben sollte, um anzu-
nehmen, dass sich die Forderungen ohne Antrag der Partheien und ohne menschliches
Zuthun vom Augenblick ihrer Coexistenz an aufh6ren. Niemand, der die stetige Weise
r6mischer Rechtsentwicklung kennt, wird es fiir wahrscheinlich halten, dass man den Weg,
aufden man Jahrhunderte lang fortgeschritten war, plbtzlich verliess und ohne Weiteres zu
einem entgegengesetzten Gesichtspunkte iibersprang'.
69. Dernburg, Kompensation, p. 283.
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tion is made, the set-off of the claims takes place ipso iure from the moment
when both claims are in opposition to each other: '... gleich als ob jener Act
schon damals eingetreten wdire, als sei die Forderung schon seit jener Zeit ipso
iure getilgt'7 ° . According to Demburg, this would be the majority opinion.
Windscheid was much clearer: 'Der rechtliche Vorgang bei der Compensa-
tion ist nicht so zu denken, als wenn die beiden einander gegeniiberstehenden
Forderungsrechte sich von der Zeit ihres Gegenfiberstehens an gegenseitig ohne
Weiters aufh6ben, vemichteten. Vielmehr behilt jedes Forderungsrecht seine
rechtliche Existenz, und es ist dem Glidubiger Oiberlassen, ob er dasselbe zur
Compensation verwenden oder in anderer Weise verwerthen will' 71. Thus, the
legal proceedings in set-off are not to be thought of as if both reciprocal claims
would be discharged automatically at the moment of their co-existence; each
claim maintains its own juridical existence, and it is left to the creditor whether
he wants to use it for set-off or to claim it in some other way. He added, how-
ever, that from the beginning the claim was affected by an exception (if the
creditor enforces his claim, the defendant would be able to invoke this excep-
tion: dolofacit qui petit, quod redditurus est (D. 44,4,8pr.]. But he was at the
same time of the view that interest would no longer run without the special
intervention of the parties.
The shift in meaning occurred imperceptibly. Having referred to Azo to jus-
tify their positions, the Pandectists gave a new meaning to the declaration by the
party. The declaration has no longer a mere declarative effect, but a constitutive
one, as evident from Windscheid and, to partial extent, Demburg. It is made as
if the declaration would have been given as soon as the claims were co-existent.
From Azo and Grotius to Dernburg and Windscheid, there is thus a shift in
the importance of the declaration; firstly declarative, the declaration of set-off
then became constitutive, i.e. the effect of set-off can only be realized by way of
declaration. It is this shift which led to retroactivity.
I11. - The Roman origin of retroactivity alleged by the Pandectists
If the Pandectists adopted a system of set-off by means of a constitutive dec-
laration, it is however not clear why the effect of this declaration should be
retroactive. I think the main reason is that they wanted to reconcile their theory
with, in particular, two texts of the Digest72 : the first one deals with the condictio
indebiti when the debtor could have set off, and has not done so, and the second
one holds that interest is not due when two claims co-exist. It is worth examin-
ing briefly these two texts.
1. - The right to a condictio indebiti
Ulp. (63 ed.)- D. 16,2,10,1:
Si quis igitur compensare potens solverit, condicere poterit quasi indebito soluto.
70. Dernburg, Kompensation, p. 288.
71. B. Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, vol. II, 7th ed., Frankfurt/Main
1891, § 349 no. 4.
72. Eisele, Die Compensation, p. 214 seq.
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Accordingly, if someone who is able to make set-off pays, he can bring a condictio
as if what was not owing has been paid.
When one reads this text without any knowledge of its context, it seems to
mean that already the possibility of set-off discharges the claims, even if the
debtor of the main claim forgets to invoke it. The Pandectists understood this
text in this general meaning. The text dealt initially, however, with a very spe-
cific case. The generalisation of the latter led the Pandectists to a wrong concep-
tion of the Roman set-off. Thus, one of their reasons for the adoption of a retro-
active effect of set-off disappears.
According to the inscriptio73 , Ulpian writes in this text about the set-off in the
venditio bonorum, which was in classical times a way of executing judgments
by selling the debtor's goods to a specific buyer (bonorum emptor). The bonorum
emptor received the estate of the bankrupt because he bid for it and offered the
higher price. To estimate what price he might be ready to pay, the bonorum
emptor had to know the amount of the claims of the bankrupt's different credi-
tors. He would then propose to pay a percentage to all the creditors who had
informed the curator bonorum of their claim.
It might well be that a creditor would be at the same time a debtor of the
bankrupt. In that case, when the bonorum emptor sued for payment of this debt
on behalf of the bankrupt, the creditor could ask the judge to reduce the amount
of his claim (agere cum deductione). This special mode of set-off was thus not
at all an automatic set-off, but a judicial one.
Ulpian gives the right to the creditor of the bankrupt to use an action similar
to a condictio indebiti when he has 'forgotten' to invoke set-off. The reason for
this is not that the claim of the bonorum emptor does not exist, but follows
merely from the fact that the creditor would have to pay less by way of set-off
than if each party had claimed separately. It is therefore as if the creditor did not
owe the difference between the two possibilities.
The creditor would have to pay less by way of set-off because he could have
reduced the whole amount of his claim if he had set-off. On the contrary, if he
had sued for payment, he would only have received the percentage fixed at the
time of the venditio bonorum. Therefore, Ulpian considers that this is a particu-
lar enough case to justify the granting of a condictio 'quasi indebito soluto',
which is instituted to avoid injustice74 .
Indeed, one can easily imagine that the bonorum emptor would often have
reduced by himself the amount of the counterclaim, as he perfectly knew its
73. 0. Lenel, Palingenesia luris civilis, Graz 1960, vol. II, no. 1426; 0. Lenel, Das
Edictumperpetuum, 3rd ed., Leipzig 1927, p. 4 2 8 footnote 4; 0. Lenel, Quellenforschungen
in den Edictcommentaren, SZ 4 (1883), p. 119 [= Gesammelte Schriften, I, p. 501]; and the
majority of the authors, contra: WI. Rozwadowski, Studi sulla compensazione nel diritto
romano, BIDR 81 (1978), p. 131 footnote 208, for whom the text deals with set-off by way
of exceptio doli.
74. Aequitas is one of the main reason for granting a condictio indebiti; see the general
principle in Pomp. D. 12,6,14: 'Nam hoc natura aequum est neminem cum alterius
detrimento fieri locupletiorem'; or Pap. D. 12,6,66: 'Haec condictio ex bono et aequo intro-
ducta, quod alterius apud alterum sine causa deprehenditur, revocare consuevit'; see among
others, Christian Wollschliger, Das stoFsche Bereicherungsverbot in der rdmischen
Rechtswissenschaft, in: R6misches Recht in der europ~ischen Tradition, Symposion fir
Franz Wieacker, Ebelsbach 1985, p. 4 1 seq.; Zimmermann, Law of obligations, p. 852 seq.
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extent, since the curator bonorum had to be informed of the claim before the
selling of the goods. But, because the claim was normally reduced, it is possible
to say that it should be reduced according to bonafides when it was not reduced
by the bonorum emptor by himself. One could consider that the amount corre-
sponding to the counterclaim was so to say not due ('quasi indebitum')75 .
Indeed, the condictio indebiti was very peculiar in this case, since the only
reason for granting it was that the creditor would have received more by using
the set-off (as he could reduce the whole amount of his initial claim) than if he
had sued the bonorum emptor directly. One should therefore not generalize upon
the result, which was reached during the Middle Ages and by the Pandectists.
This text as such cannot therefore justify a retroactive effect of set-off.
2. - Interest no longer accrues
In the following text, Paul76 refers to a decision of the Emperor Septimius
Severus (193-211 AD) 77, who decided a case in which interest ceased to accrue
in a contract of societas:
Paul. (32 ed.) - D. 16,2,11:
Cum alter alteri pecuniam sine usuris, alter usurariam debet, constitutum est a divo
Severo concurrentis apud utrumque quantitatis usuras non esse praestandas.
When one party owes the other money without interest and the latter owes money
with interest, it has been decided in a constitutio by the deified Severus that the
interest on the respective sums of both parties is not to be paid.
In this text, there are two claims opposed to each other, one with and one
without interest. The Emperor decided that as soon as the claims were opposed
to each other, the interest - and only the interest - need not be paid. In the
Middle Ages authors referred always to this text as a ground for their theory of
75. See also E. Stampe, Das Compensations verfahren im voriustinianischen stricti
iuris iudicium, Leipzig 1886, p. 24 seq.
76. Ch. Appleton (Histoire de la compensation en droit romain, Paris 1895, p. 85
seq.) convincingly demonstrated that the text is probably by Paul and not by Ulpian, con-
trary to what one would think by reading the word 'idem' in the inscriptio; Book 32 by
Paul dealt with societas (Lenel, Palingenesia, I, no. 500 and footnote 3), book 32 by Ulpian
dealt with contract of sale and locatio-conductio (Lenel, Palingenesia, 1I, no. 930 seq).
Compilators might have forgotten to change the idem of the inscriptio when they changed
its place in the title (i.e.: Paul) D. 16,2,11, initially situated just after Paul. D. 16,2,9, to be
replaced after Ulp. D. 16,2,12, which dealt also with the issue of interest. It is also unusual
that a fragment excerpted from a later book is placed before (fr. 10 comes from book 63 by
Ulpian and fr. 11 from book 32 by Ulpian); moreover, both persons must pay to the other
an amount of money, which is rather unusual for a contract of sale, locatio-conductio (dealt
with in book 32), but common for mandate orsocietas (dealt with in book 32 by Paul); see
also Lenel, SZ 4 (1883), p. 119 footnote 23 [= Gesammelte Schriften, I, p. 501], followed
by Solazzi, Compensazione, p. 159.
77. This rescriptum does no more exist; Cuiacius (Notae in Tit. XXXI lib. IV Cod.,
Opera omnia, vol. IX, ed. Prati 1837, col. 492) was of the opinion that the rescriptum was
by Alexander Severus (C. 4,31,4, a. 229); for arguments in favour of a rescriptum by
Septimius Severus, see Paul Kretschmar, Uber die Entwicklung der Kompensation im
rdmischen Rechte, Leipzig 1907, p. 70 footnote 123.
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an automatic set-off. The Emperor did not say, however, at least not expressly,
that the claim and counter-claim were set-off, but only that the interest need not
be paid on the corresponding amount.
According to the inscriptio, it is possible to conclude that this text deals with
a case of societas71. It is then possible to envisage several hypotheses in which,
after conclusion of a contract of societas, such a case occurs. A socius may pay
interest, among other reasons, on the following grounds:
(1) When an associate lends money with interest to a third party on behalf of the
societas, he has to return the amount and the interest he thereby received79 . The
interest is the equivalent of the profit obtained by the associate through his deal-
ings with a third party. Our text does not really seem to envisage such an hy-
pothesis.
(2) When an associate does not return immediately the profits obtained while
dealing on behalf of the societas, he will have to pay interest for the loss of
profit ('non quasi usuras, sed quod socii intersit moram eum non adhibuisse',
not as interest as such, but for the loss of profit due to the delay of the associate
in returning the money)8".
(3) When an associate uses money of the societas for his own benefit, he has to
return it with interest, even without being in delay 1 .
In my opinion, the text can only envisage a case of abuse of common funds;
interest is then due for the delay in returning the money or for unlawful personal
use.
Thus, in a societas with only two associates, which is the case in our text
('alter alteri'), the obligation to return money to the societas amounts theoreti-
cally82 to giving half of the money to the other associate. Therefore, there is no
longer an abuse of common funds where the other associate is equally obliged
to return an amount of money which he has held unlawfully. The interest for
abusive use should thus be limited to the amount which is equal. However, a
constitution of the Emperor was necessary as, in fact, the amounts have not been
paid to the other party 83. The constitution is based on equity.
Interest is no longer incurred, not because there is set-off, but because it is no
longer equitable to penalize the keeping of the money by the incurring of inter-
est. In both cases interest is probably of the same amount, since interest here is
legal and not conventional. This may also explain why the text does not speak
about the rate of interest.
It is therefore possible to reject the explanation given for this text by modern
authors8 4:
78. See supra footnote 73.
79. Paul. D. 17,2,67,1-2 (32 aded.).
80. Pomp. D. 17,2,60 (13 ad Sab.).
81. Pomp. D. 17,2,60 (13 adSab.); Pap. D. 22,1,1,1 (2 quaest.).
82. It is the communio of ideal parts; see e.g. M. Kaser, Das Rimische Privatrecht,
vol. 1, 2nd ed, Munchen 1971, p. 575; Wieacker, Das Gesellschafterverhdltnis des
klassischen Rechts, SZ 69 (1952), p. 332 seq.
83. Renzo Rezzonico (Ii procedimento di compensazione nel diritto romano classico,
Basel 1958, p. 19) grounds also the fact that interest are no longer incurred on equity; but,
curiously, he is of the opinion that ifa party, instead of keeping the amount had paid it, he
would not have to pay interest and is therefore of the opinion that it should be the same in
case of set-off.
84. Biondi, Compensazione, p. 155, is of the opinion that the text was deeply altered;
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1. - Some said there was an implicit85 or explicit86 agreement for set-off. But
then it is difficult to imagine what purpose would be left for the actiopro socio87 .
Moreover, the text does not say anything about the set-off of the claims them-
selves. I do not consider that the fact that the text is part of Titel 16,2 de
compensationibus of the Digest suffices for the view that there is a proper set-
off. The effect on the interest is rather of the same kind as the compensation for
negligence in a previous passage (Ulp. D. 16,2,1Opr.).
2. - Others thought the text was dealing with claims existing before the con-
stitution of a societas omnium bonorum88. There are however no indications in
favour of such a solution.
Thus, the text cannot be used to ground any retroactive effect of set-off. In-
deed, the text has some features in common with an authentic case of set-off,
but the dogmatic reasons are different. Our interpretation may also be confirmed
by another text of Ulpian dealing with the relation between ward and pupil. The
reasoning is to a good degree the same:
Ulp. (36 ed.) - D. 27,4,3,3:
Quare et si in usus suos convertit, deinde aliquid impendit in rem pupillarem, quam
impendit desinit vertisse et exinde usuras non praestabit. Et si ante impendit in rem
pupillarem, mox in usus suos vertit, non videbitur vertisse quantitatem, quae
concurrit cum quantitate sibi debita, ut eius summae non praestet usuras.
And so if he put something to his own use and then paid something on behalf of the
pupil, he ceases to have converted what he paid out and so will not pay interest. And
if he first paid out on the business of the pupil and he put something to his own use,
he is not considered to have converted that amount which agrees in sum with that
which he is owed and on that amount he will not pay interest.
Here again we have interest to be paid as the result of an abusive use of funds
belonging to someone else (the pupil). But, as soon as the ward uses his own
money to pay a debt of his pupil the 'penal' interest is no longer due. Again,
however, there is no set-off between a claim of the pupil against the ward and
he therefore replaces the words 'concurrentis apud utrumque quantitatis' with 'post
condemnationem' (!), in order to get a text, which reproduces the classical general rule;
contra: Rezzonico, p. 16; Solazzi, Compensazione, p. 161 seq.
85. See also Appleton, p. 87 seq.; Kretschmar, p. 71 (who admits the ius singulare in a
contract of societas because of the iusfraternitatis); contra: Solazzi, Compensazione, p.
160.
86. Such an explicit provision cannot explain the decision taken by the Emperor
Severus.
87. Underlining that the actio pro socio was the final settlement of all claims, see esp.
Wieacker, SZ 69 (1952), p. 9; followed by Honsell / Mayer-Maly / Selb, Dos R6mische
Recht, p. 334; Zimmermann, Law of obligations, p. 460; and Kaser, Das rdmische Privat-
recht I, p. 575 seq. (however with distinctions); contra: V. Arangio-Ruiz, I1 contratto di
societ in diritto romano, Naples 1950, p. 176 seq.; Mariagrazia Bianchini, Studi sulla
societas, Milan 1967, p. 94 seq. - See on the question of the actio pro socio 'manente
societate', K.-H. Misera, Klagen manente societate, in: K. Bruchhausen (edit.), Me1. Rudolf
Nirk, Miinchen 1992, p. 697-705.
88. Solazzi, Compensazione, p. 161 seq., who finally doubts that the original text by
Paul dealt with set-off; followed by Kreller, Kritische Digestenexegesen zur 'compensatio',
IVRA 2 (1951), p. 92.
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the counter-claim of the ward against the pupil. The set-off will only take place
at the end of the relationship, by means of the actio tutelae89.
Thus, the two main grounds of justification used by the Pandectists to base a
retroactive effect on the Roman sources failed. The misunderstanding of these
two texts led, however, to a doctrine of automatic set-off during the Middle
Ages and encouraged the Pandectists to recognise a retroactive effect to the
declaration of set-off.
However, there is a third argument which led the Pandectists to envisage a
retroactive effect of set-off. For them, the declaration of set-off was understood
as an authentic exception which had to be pleaded in court. Windscheid, for
example, stated that it is not possible for the debtor to definitively extinguish
both claims other than by means of opposing an exception for set-off and by a
judgment rejecting the creditor's claim, and in particular not through a unilat-
eral declaration not pleaded in court9". If this is so, one can understand why
there is a need for a retroactive effect of the exceptio compensationis. Indeed, in
the absence of the retroactive effect, the creditor of the larger amount could
have waited quite a long time before going to court; as a result, if the effect of
set-off would have been ex nunc, the creditor would have received interest by
unduly delaying his claim, since the defendant had almost to wait till the en-
forcement of the main claim to oppose set-off.
The reason for the retroactive effect disappears, however, as soon as one can
declare set-off outside of court. In Switzerland, von Wyss had already stated in
his comment on the draft of the old Swiss Code of obligations in 1877 that the
declaration should be allowed to take place in or outside court91 and, conse-
quently, rejected the retroactive effect of set-off. His proposal was however not
followed on the second point.
Of course, the fact that the retroactive effect of set-off is not grounded upon a
correct analysis of the Roman sources does not by itself supply a good enough
reason for the adoption of an effect ex nunc. We have therefore to consider
whether there are today dogmatic reasons in favour of such a retroactive effect.
89. Kaser, Das r6mische Privatrecht I, p. 576.
90. Windscheid, Pandektenrecht, 7th ed., II, p. 295 footnote 15 (see also Windscheid
/ Kipp, Pandektenrecht, 9th ed., p. 4 7 0 seq. footnote 15); see also Demburg, Kompensation,
2nd ed, p. 529 seq. and esp. 530 footnote 1 and on this question also Richter, Studien zur
Geschichte der Gestaltungsrechte des deutschen biirgerlichen Rechts, th. Miinster 1939, p.
19 seq., 41 seq. - In Austria, the first writer to plead for a declaration to be effective even
if made outside a courtroom was Victor Hasen6hrl, Das Obligationenrecht, 1 st ed., Wien
1890, vol. II, p. 561 seq., 2nd ed., p. 570 and possibly before him Unger, Fragmente aus
einem System des 6sterr. Obligationenrechts, GrinhutsZ 15 (1888), p. 545, 550 footnote
27 (cited according to Dullinger, Handbuch der Aufrechnung, Wien-New York 1995, p.
98).
91. Von Wyss, Motive, p. 39: '...wir [gehen] mit dem Principe des Entwurfes einig ....
insofern als er die Compensation nicht stillschweigend, sondern nur in Folge ausdriicklichen
Begehrens des Berechtigten eintreten 1Isst. An eine besondere Form soll dieses Begehren
nicht gebunden sein; es kann daher gerichtlich oder aussergerichtlich stattfinden und im
ersteren Falle von Seite des Beklagten oder des Kliigers gestellt werden. Einer Annahme
von Seiten des Glubigers, also eines Vertrages, bedarf es nicht'.
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IV. - The absence of any justification for the maintenance of a retroactive
effect in modern Contract law
The ambit of this paper does not allow me to present all the arguments in
favour of an ex nunc-effect in every last detail92 . It is possible, however, to
regroup such arguments under two main points93.
1. - The debtor's free disposal of his counterclaim
As the drafters of the German Civil Code (BGB) noted, as soon as two claims
co-exist, the debtor can declare set-off at any time 94, if he is aware of this possi-
bility. They, as well as the drafters of the New Dutch Civil Code9 5, were of the
opinion, however, that the debtor usually waits till he is sued before he invokes
set-off. He must therefore be protected in his belief that he no longer owes any-
thing. This reasoning is defective on at least three counts:
1. - Each party has already what is due to him only if the two claims-are of
the same amount, which is usually not the case in practice. If the amounts are
different, a remaining obligation is due in any case by one or the other party.
2. - The fact that one is in a position to set-off a claim does not already affect
one's own claim. This is well recognized in a system of set-off by declaration;
the effect cannot begin before the declaration is made. One might still have the
impression that the debtor does no longer owe something to the creditor as soon
as he is in a position to set-off his claim, but this is the mere result of the previ-
ous doctrine of automatic set-off. To protect a debtor who has not yet declared
set-off would be without doubt to introduce a position foreign to the system
inherited from the automatic set-off approach. It is this same reasoning which
led the Pandectists to develop their 'Affektionstheorie' of the claims (claims
being in some way 'marked' as soon as two claims were co-existent, even be-
fore a declaration of set-off)96 . This theory, however, does not work as soon as
92. For detailed explanations on Austrian Law, see Dullinger, Handbuch der
Aufrechnung, p. 158 seq.
93. 1 will not deal here with provisions enabling the debtor to set-off, even if one of the
conditions for this no longer exists (in the case of transfer of a claim to a third person). In
these cases, there is no proper retroactive effect of set-off. A provision only protects the
good faith of the debtor by allowing set-off even if this would not be possible in terms of
the ordinary provisions. Most legislations have a special provision dealing with this case,
e.g. art. 6:130 al. I BW; § 406 BGB; art. 169 al. 2 CO.
94. B. Mugdan, Die gesamten Materialien zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch fir das
deutsche Reich, vol. II: Recht der Schuldverhdltnisse, Berlin 1899, reprint 1979, p. 562:
'[2. Lesung] Es sei nicht iiblich, dass der Schuldner, wenn er seinerseits eine Forderung
gegen den Gldubiger erwerbe, sofort die Aufrechnung erkldre; vielmehr pflege er zu warten,
his der Gldubiger ihn durch Geltendmachung seiner Forderung Anlass hiezu biete. Von
dem Augenblick an, in welchem die beiden Forderungen einander aufrechenbar
gegendibertreten, habejeder Theil das in Hinden, was er von dem anderen Theile zu fordern
babe, und er k6nne dar-bber frei verf'igen, weil er die Forderung des anderen durch die
Aufrechnung zurfickzuweisen verm6ge'.
95. Parlementaire Geschiedenis, Boek 6, Algemeen Gedeelte van bet verbintenissen-
recht, Deventer 1981, p. 4 9 7 (ad. art. 6.1.10.6.1 ).
96. E.g. Brinz, Compensation, p. 11 seq. and Brinz, Pandekten, 2nd ed., vol. 1I/1, p.
419 seq.; Windscheid, Pandektenrecht, 7th ed., p. 290 (9th ed., p. 463 seq.); contra how-
ever Eisele, Kompensation, p. 259 seq.
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there are several claims on both sides, as usually the party declaring set-off has
the choice to decide which claims should be discharged97. The law provides
only default rules 98.
3. - A debtor must not be led to wait until the creditor sues him before he
declares set-off Declaration of set-off is very easily achieved, and no form is
required. The approach that one should wait until one is sued is a mere remnant
of the old theory of automatic set-off and can only be justified in a system where
declaration has to be made in court, which is not the case in Germany, Switzer-
land or the Netherlands for instance. Moreover, it would be from an economic
point of view much better to give an incentive to the debtor to declare set-off as
soon as he is aware of the possibility. This is in the interest of transaction secu-
rity and commercial certainty; there exists clarity in the relationship from an
early stage, which allows one to avoid unnecessary legal expenses.
Furthermore, if set-off is regarded as a way of simplifying payment, why
should a debtor who sets off be treated differently from one who in effect pays?
Indeed, by accepting the retroactivity idea, in the latter case, the debtor will
have to pay interest until he pays what he owes, even if he had enough money to
pay well before the effective payment; but, even if he waits a long time before
declaring set-off, the debtor will have to pay no interest at all if he uses his right
to set-off. The same applies to a penal clause. But why such a difference if set-
off is merely a substitute for payment?
In my view, since the debtor has some liberty in the disposal of his counter-
claim, he must also bear the risk linked to this liberty. He should be liable for
interest until the declaration of set-off is made99 , as he is liable for interest until
the effective payment. And this should apply in identical manner with regard to
the consequences of delay or penal clauses.
Moreover, the principle of non-retroactivity seems to be in accordance with
the principle of the statute of limitation (praescriptio). Indeed, why should the
debtor be able to raise a time-barred counterclaim against the creditor when the
debtor had no interest in suing him before? The function of the statute of limita-
tion is to fix a limit on the right of action of the creditor who does not show any
interest in his claim. Why should this initial absence of interest suddenly be
forgotten, as soon as the other party brings a claim against the debtor? It would
have been very easy for the creditor of the time-barred claim to declare set-off
when this was still possible'00 .
I would only be in favour of a different solution, in the case of claims arising
97. Windscheid, Pandektenrecht, 7th ed., p. 296 seq., who is of the opinion that the
debtor can choose which of the counterclaims he will use; retroactivity should rather lead
to a determination according to the moment at which the counterclaim came into existence;
see for such a position in German Law: Enneccerus / Lehmann, Lehrbuch des Schuld-
rechts, 15th ed., Marburg-Tubingen 1958, p. 290 seq.
98. See today in Germany, § 396 al. 1 BGB, which refers to § 366 al. 2 BGB.
99. See also Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung (n. 3), p. 723: 'Solange zur Aufrechnung
nicht mehr erforderlich ist als eine formlose Erklirung gegenaiber dem Aufrechnungs-
gegner, verlangt die Rechtsordnung sicherlich nicht zu viel von einem Schuldner, der daran
interessiert ist, keine Zinsen mehr auf seine Verbindlichkeit zahlen zu missen, oder von
einem GlIubiger, dessen Forderung von der Verjihrung bedroht ist'.
100. Cf. F. Peters / R. Zimmermann, Veridhrungsfristen, in: Bundesminister der Justiz,
Gutachten und VorschlIge zur Uberarbeitung des Schuldrechts, Bd 1, K61n 1981, p. 266.
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out of the same contract' 01. In this latter case, it is possible to find a reason for
allowing the defendant to invoke his time-barred counterclaim, since he might
have renounced it under the implied assumption that the other party would not
sue him.
2. - An unjustified surety
The last point I would like to raise is the following. The retroactive effect of
set-off plays an important role in the bankruptcy of a debtor, creditor of a coun-
terclaim. It is generally recognized that the party who is able to set-off against a
bankrupt has a privileged position, in other words that he has at his disposal a
kind of surety which breaks through the principle 'par conditio creditorum' 102.
He can avoid the risk of bankruptcy proceedings and enforce his whole claim,
instead of getting only a percentage (a dividend) by declaring set-off after the
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.
However, most of the time this surety remains hidden for third party credi-
tors. Indeed, in contrast to surety with respect to movable property, there is no
open transfer of the possession of the surety' 03 , and no notation in a register as
for immovable surety'0 4 . Why should then the creditor who can be sued by the
bankrupt person be advantaged, even though he could have very easily declared
set-off before the bankruptcy? When claims arise out of the same contract, one
may see a reason for allowing set-off where a claim is due only after bankruptcy
is declared; but this is probably the only case.
Art. 213 al. 2 of the new Swiss Bankruptcy Law recognizes set-off, for in-
stance, when the counterclaim first became due before the declaration of bank-
ruptcy, but not afterwards'. This is therefore typically a case based on the idea
of retroactivity of set-off. This solution, however, lacks a sound dogmatic ba-
sis'0 6 ; it is (again) a mere remnant of the previous theory of automatic set-off.
Conclusion
As the drafters of the BGB noted, to deny a retroactive effect to the declara-
tion of set-off has the advantage of creating a legal situation which is simple and
clear, and which is harmonious with the fact that the claims remain unaffected
until the declaration of set-off07 . Thus, it seems to me that the retroactive effect
101. Ibidem.
102. See for a similar position, Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung (n. 3), p. 72 6.
103. See for instance art. 884 al. 3 Swiss Civil Code; § 1205 BGB.
104. See for instance art. 799 Swiss Civil Code; § 1115 BGB.
105. '2 Toute compensation est toutefois exclue: 1. Lorsque le d6biteur du failli est
devenu son cr6ancier post~rieurement A l'ouverture de la faillite, A moins qu'il ait ex6cut6
une obligation n6e antrieurement ou qu'il ait d6grev6 une chose mise en gage pour la dette
du failli et qu'il poss~de sur cette chose un droit de propri&6t ou un droit r6el limit& (art.
110, ch. 1, CO); 2. Lorsque le cr6ancier du failli est devenu son d6biteur ou celui de la
masse post6rieurement A l'ouverture de la faillite'.
106. See for German Law § 94 InsO: '[Erhaltung einer Aufrechnungslage]. Ist ein
Insolvenzgldubiger zur Zeit der Er6ffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens kraft Gesetzes oder auf
Grund einer Vereinbarung zur Aufrechnung berechtigt, so wird dieses Recht durch das
Verfahren nicht beriihrt'.
107. Mugdan, Materialien I, p. 60: '...dass durch die Verneinung der riickwirkenden
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of set-off does not, as the authors of the Dresdener Draft thought, go without
saying. On the contrary, as long as set-off was merely judicial or automatic,
retroactive effect was not an issue. The effect of a declaration of set-off taking
place prior to the declaration itself, was in fact an attempt made by the
Pandectists to reconcile their theory with Roman law texts. To some extent, it
was also a way to comply with some practical consequences of their conception,
i.e. with the fact that declaration of set-off could only be made in court.
Our analysis has attempted to show that the retroactive effect of set-off has
no more dogmatic or practical justification, as soon as the strict procedural ap-
proach of declaration is abandoned and as soon as it is possible to declare set-off
at any time, even outside of court.
One might be surprised therefore that the New Dutch Civil Code has kept the
retroactive effect of set-off, even though this codification was the result of in-
tensive comparative research spanning decades. With the adoption of a system
of set-off by way of declaration, I think the drafters should have chosen to deny
the granting of any retroactive effect to set-off.
The Lando Principles seem therefore to follow the right path. Their choice of
a set-off by declaration with only ex nunc effect produces a harmonious solution,
which has to be preferred to any other'0 8. One might note that this is already the
solution which prevails under Swedish law 10 9 .
This essay had also a further purpose, which was to show how an historical
evolution may be grounded upon a 'productive misunderstanding"'". Identifi-
Kraft klares und einfaches Recht geschaffen wiirde und dass diese Verneinung auch mit
der dem Entwurfe zu Grunde liegenden Auffassung, wonach sich beide Forderungen bis
zur Aufrechnungserklirung des einen oder anderen Theiles unabhingig und unbeeinflusst
von einander gegeniiberstehen, eher im Einklange stdinde. Denn nicht ohne Grund kann
gesagt werden, dass mit der Aufstellung der riickwirkenden Kraft im Wesentlichen doch
anerkannt werde, dass schon von dem Zeitpunkt an, wo die Forderungen sich kompensa-
tionsfihig gegeniibertreten, die eine von der anderen beeinflusst sei, und dass die Verlegung
der Tilgung in die Vergangenheit nur im Wege positiver Satzung durch eine juristische
Fiktion m6glich sei'.
108. See for the position paper presented by Prof. Zimmermann at the Lando Commis-
sion, Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung (n. 3), p. 707-739.
109. See for instance S. Lindskog, Kvittning, 2nd ed., Stockholm 1993, p. 565 and
K. Rodhe, Obligationsritt, Lund 1984, p. 71; also Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung (n. 3),
p. 719.
110. The expression was first used in a legal context, in Dutch, by H.R. Hoetink as
'productief misverstaan' in his speech, Historische Rechtsbeschouwing, held as Rector
Magnificus on 10 January 1949 on the occasion of the 316th Dies natalis of the University
of Amsterdam, Haarlem 1949, page 25; the text has been translated in English by R.W.
Daniel and I. Wildenberg and published in: H.R. Hoetink, Law as an object of historical
reflexion, in: J.A. Ankum et al. (edit.), Opera selecta H.R. Hoetink, Zutphen (Holland)
1986, p. 133 seq. (in particular p. 147, 'productive misunderstanding'); Hoetink indicates
that he borrowed the expression from E. Seeberg, Luthers Theologie. Motive und Ideen, I:
Die Gottesanschauung, Gottingen 1929 and, in particular, from the recension of this book
by H.J. Iwand, Dt Literaturzeitung, 1929, col. 1613 ('Damit ist bereits das zweite Charak-
teristikum dieser neuen Lutherauffassung angegeben, das in einem methodischen Prinzip
liegt. S. bezeichnet es gem paradox als 'produktives Missverstehen', worunter er die
Umprigung iuberkommener Formen und Begriffe zu neuen Bedeutungen versteht'); see
also Seeberg, Luthers Theologie, p. 105 ('Missdeutung Luthers'), p. 116 ('Die Idee kann
[...] aus der negativen Gotteslehre der neuplatonischen Metaphysik in produktivem Miss-
verstehen gewonnen sein'). The expression should not be understood in a pejorative way
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cation of the latter may enhance our understanding of the actual situation at
issue and may lead to different or new solutions, and which themselves are more
thoughtfully conceived.
(see Hoetink, Law as an object of historical reflexion, p. 149); see however W. Kunkel,
Fides als sch6pferisches Element im r6mischen Schuldrecht, in: Festschrift P. Koschaker,
vol. II, Weimar 1939, p. 8: 'Dass historische Irrtiimer schhpferisch wirken, ist nicht
Ungew6hnliches'. - I am grateful to Prof. em. R. Feenstra and Prof. em. F. Wubbe, who
both helped me to trace down the origin of this well-known expression in a legal context.
